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THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY:
COALITION PROOF EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES WITH INFINITE STRATEGY SPACES
I. Introduction
In non-cooperative games with the pre-play communication,
Bernheim-Peleg-Whinston (B-P-W) have argued that one should focus attention on
a refinement of Nash equilibrium, called Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium
(CPNE) . This concept appears a promising way to model the ability of
coalitions of economic agents to co-ordinate their activities in an incentive
compatible fashion. The B-P-W definition is complicated, requiring the use of
a recursion on the number of players considered in the game. Moreover, we
show below that the B-P-W definition appears to provide unreasonable solutions
in games with infinite strategy spaces. Since most economic applications
involve infinite strategy spaces, a modification of the solution concept is
called tor.
There is an alternative characterization of Coalition Proof Equilibrium
in terms of consistency of a set of equilibria for a family of games (see for
example Greenberg [1986]). Surprisingly, however, the consistency
characterization is not equivalent to the B-P-W definition in the case of
games with infinite strategy spaces. We provide an example where the
consistency characterization yields no equilibria but there are equilibria
according to the B-P-W definition.
We show that situations in which the correspondence fails are situations
in which the consistent set does not exist. Therefore we provide a weakened
2
notion which we call semi-consistency. We prove that families of
semi -consistent solutions always exist, and that the family is unique in
finite player games. The semi-consistent characterization yields a refinement
of the B-P-W definition; moreover, as we show in examples, cases where they
diverge are cases where the B-P-W definition yields unreasonable outcomes.
Still it is valuable to restore the correspondence between the recursive
and the consistency definitions. In order to do this we further modify the
solution concept to incorporate a kind of "near- rational" behavior for
coalitions. With this modification, it turns out that the difficulties noted
above disappear: There always exists a consistent set, and the equilibria so
characterized are precisely the CPNE of the recursive definition.
Our method for modeling near-rationality is of interest in its own right:
Rather Chan following the standard approach of epsilon equilibrium, we proceed
by modeling agents as choosing, not single actions, but convergent sequences
of actions, with payoffs defined by the limit point of these action sequences.
The interpretation is that they choose actions "sufficiently far along" these
sequences, and thereby gain little by going to the limit.
Finally we consider the case of games with infinite numbers of players.
Since the consistency characterization does not depend on finite recursions on
the set of players, it is the suitable candidate for extension to the infinite
player case. We demonstrate that a semi-consistent partition always exists,
but need not be unique. However we show that the minimal semi -consistent
partition can be easily characterized, and therefore propose as the natural
extension a "strong" coalition proof equilibrium, characterized as belonging
to every semi-consistent partition.
A natural economic application for a game with an infinite number of
players is any situation with free entry. For the use of the solution
concepts of this paper to investigate a problem in information economics, see
Kahn-Mookherjee [1989].
II. Simple Agreements
Let N be the (countable) set of players, with ieN denoting a typical
player. Let A
,
U respectively denote the strategy space and payoff functions
i i
of i and let A = Y „ A .
U : A -> (R.
i
Define an agreement to be a pair (a,S) where aGA and SCN. Let A denote
the set of possible agreements.
Note that an agreement specifies actions for all players, not just those
in S. The reader may find it helpful to interpret an agreement as specifying
the actions for the parties to the agreement, given the actions of other
players
.
Agreement (b,S) trump s agreement (a,T) (denoted (b,S) > (a,T) ) if
(i) S C T
(ii) a = b for all j e N\S
j j
(iii) U (b) > U (a) for all i e S.
i i
In other words, a trumping agreement is one in which a subset of the
original parties break away and find actions which are strictly better for all
of the subset, the rest of the players leaving their actions unchanged.
The pair {G,B} is a consistent partition of the set of agreements /A
where G denotes the set of "good" agreements, and B denotes its complement,
the set of "bad" agreements -- if
(a,T) e B o There exists (b,S) 6 G such that (b,S) > (a,T)
(a,T) e G » There does not exist (b,S) £ G such that (b,S) > (a,T)
In other words, every agreement in G is trumped only by agreements in B, and
3
every agreement in B is trumped by some agreement in G.
It is not clear that a consistent partition always exists, or if it does,
whether it is unique. However, if a consistent partition (G,B} does exist, it
generates a solution concept in the following way: the set of solutions to the
game is the set of strategy vectors a such that (a,N) is in the set G.
In the case of a finite number of players and strategies, it can be shown
that there always exists a unique partition; this is established below. But in
finite-player, infinite-strategy games, a consistent partition may not exist.
Example 1 Consider a one player game N = (i), A = (0,1) and U (a ) = a .
i i i i
If G is non-empty, it must contain a single agreement -- otherwise one
* *
agreement in G will trump another. Let G = {(a ,{i})}. Then (a +e,{i))eB, and
i i
therefore must be trumped by some agreement in G, which is a contradiction. G
cannot be empty, because then every agreement would be in B, and by definition
every agreement in B must be trumped by some agreement in G.l
Example 1 would no longer hold if the player had a compact strategy
space. But with more players, this problem may arise even with compact
strategy spaces and continuous utility functions.
Example 2 Suppose N= (1,2,3), A = [0,1] for all i and
i
U(a,a,a)=a - la -a I1123 2 ' 1 2 1
U (a ,a ,a ) = 2a - a - la -a I
2 12 3 1 3 ' 2 3 1
U (a ,a ,a ) = 2a -a - |a-a|(l-a+a)
3 12 3 1 2 ' 1 3 l 12
The best response correspondences are
a (a , a ) = a
1 2 3 2
a ( a
,
a ) = a and
2 13 3
a (a ,a ) = [0,1] if a = 1 and a =
3 12 i > J x 2
a otherwise.
l
Suppose there exists a consistent partition {G,B}. First note that
((a,a,a),(i}) G G if a G a (a ), where a denotes the strategy- tuple of123 ii-i -i
players other than i -- this is because such agreements cannot be trumped, as
i is playing a best response. Next, note that (a,N) G G implies a must be a
Nash equilibrium -- otherwise it can be trumped by a singleton-agreement
involving a best-response strategy. Hence (a,N) G G implies a = a = a .
We claim that there is no (a,N) G G. Suppose ((a,a,a),N) G G and
((b,b,b),N) G G with b > a; then the latter would trump the former, a
contradiction. Suppose there is a unique a G [0,1] such that ((a,a,a),N) G G.
If a < 1, then it follows that ((a+e, a+e, a+e),N) G B, which requires
( (a+e , a+e , a+e ) , N) to be trumped by some agreement in G. Clearly it cannot be
trumped by any singleton coalition agreement, nor by ((a,a,a),N). So
( (a+e , a+e , a+e ) , N) must be trumped by some pair-coalition agreement. Suppose it
is trumped by ( (a ,£ , a+e ) , { 1 , 2 } ) G G. For this it is necessary that a and /9
both exceed a+e. But if > a+e, ( (a ,£, a+e ) , { 1 , 2 } ) is trumped by
((a, a+e ,a+e)
, {2} ) G G, contradicting the hypothesis that ( (a,fi , a+e ) , { 1 , 2 } ) eG
.
Suppose, alternatively, that ( (a+e , a+e , a+e ) ,N) is trumped by ( (a+e ,/3 , 7) , { 2 , 3 }
)
E G. This requires £ = 7 < a+e , but a+e < 1 implies that ( (a+e ,0, 7) , { 2 , 3 } ) is
trumped by ( (a+e ,/?, a+e ) , { 3 } ) E G, a contradiction. Finally, it is
straightforward to show that ( (a+e , a+e , a+e ) ,N) cannot be trumped by any
agreement involving coalition {1,3}.
It remains to consider the possibility that ((1,1,1), N) is the unique
agreement for N that is in G. But ((1,1,1),N) is trumped by ( (1 , , 0) , { 2 , 3 } )EG
.
Hence there exists no (a,N) E G. For any a < 1, then, ((a,a,a),N) must be
in B, and therefore trumped by some agreement in G. Repeating the same
argument as for ( (a+e , a+e , a+e ) ,N) , however, this can be ruled out.l
We now propose the following modification of the notion of a consistent
partition. A semi -cons is tent partition {G,U,B} of the set of agreements A --
into a good set G, an ugly set U, and a bad set B - - is one where
(a,T) E B o There exists (b.S) E G such that (b,S) > (a,T)
(a,T) E G o (b,S) (a,T) only if (b,S) E B
U = A \ (G U B)
In other words B consists of all agreements trumped by agreements in G, and G
consists of all agreements which are not trumped, except possibly by
agreements in B
.
A semi-consistent partition is weaker than a consistent partition in that
the good and the bad sets do not exhaust the set of all agreements: there may
be agreements that are neither good, nor bad. The following lemma establishes
some properties of this ugly set.
Lemma 1
:
(a) Any (a,S) in U is trumped by some (b,T) in U. Hence U is
either empty or infinite.
(b) In finite player, finite-strategy games, U is empty. Hence a
semi-consistent partition is a consistent partition in such games.
(c) (a,S) G U cannot be trumped by any (b,T) e G. Hence with compact
strategy sets and continuous utility functions, (a,N) e U implies a is a Nash
equilibrium.
Proof (a) (a,S) e U must be trumped by some agreement (b,T) , otherwise it
would be in G. If (b,T) e G then (a,S) would be in B instead. If (a,S) is not
trumped by another agreement in U, then (b,T) e B. But then (a,S) G G, a
contradiction.
(b) Follows from (a), since A is finite in finite games.
(c) is obvious.
Ugly sets are therefore "open" in the sense of containing infinite
sequences of agreements trumping one another, but none of which are trumped by
a good agreement. With compact strategy spaces and continuous utility
functions, they involve members of the coalition playing best responses --
i.e., they are self -enforcing in the strict non-cooperative sense.
Theorem 1: A semi-consistent partition always exists.
Proof Define:
G
Q
= l(a,S)eA| there is no (b,T) in A trumping (a.S)}
Bq = {(c,V)e/A| there is some (a,S)eG trumping (c,V)}.
Now define G
,
B inductively for i = 1,2,3, •••, by:
i i
G = {(a,S)GA| (b,T) trumps (a,S) => (b,T) G B )
i i - 1
B = {(c,V)gA| there is (a,S)GG trumping (c,V)}.
i i
It is obvious that the sets G and B form an increasing sequence.
i i
Define G = uG and B = U B .
i =0 i i = i
We claim that GnB = 0. Suppose otherwise that (a,S) G GnZ . Then for some
i: (a,S) G G„nB-, for all Z>i . Now (a,S)eB- implies that there exists (b,T)GG.
that trumps (a,S). Since (a,S)GG„ as well, it follows that (b,T)GB. . So
there exists (c,V)gG» that trumps (b,T). Since (b,T)GG„, it is trumped only
by agreements in B« ; therefore (c,V) g B„ ^ Gp
Repeating this argument, there must exist (d,W) G B nG
,
a contradiction.
If U = A - (GuB)
,
we establish that {G,U,B} is a semi -consistent
partition. Suppose (a,S)GG, and it is trumped by (b,T). Suppose (a,S)GG„. Then
(b,T)GB„
,
implying (b.T)EB. On the other hand, if (b,T)GB, let (b.T)GB-.
Then it is trumped by (a,S)GG„, which must be in G.
The previous theorem gives a procedure for generating a semi -consistent
partition. The next theorem establishes that in a game with a finite number
of players there is no other semi -consistent partition.
Theorem 2
:
For finite player games, the semi-consistent partition is
unique
.
Proof: See appendix.
Theorems 1 and 2 give rise to the following definition:
A strategy vector a is a Semi- Consistent Coalition Proof Equilibrium
(S-CPNE) if (a,N) 6 G in the semi-consistent partition of agreements.
Corollary 1: Every strong equilibrium is an S-CPNE.
Proof: In the proof of theorem 1, the strategy vectors a such that (a,N)
is in G are precisely the strong equilibria.
It should be kept in mind that the existence of a CPNE is a separate
issue from the issue of existence of a consistent or semi-consistent
partition. A semi-consistent partition always exists, but no CPNE --of either
variety -- may exist. In example 2, this is precisely the case: there is no
(a,N) in the good set of the semi-consistent partition. All Nash equilibria of
the form ((a, a, a), N; with a < 1 are in the ugly set, while ((1,1,1), N) is in
the set B.
Obviously, when a consistent partition exists, the equilibria it
generates are identical to the S-CPNE. We now explore the connection of
S-CPNE with the recursive definition of a CPNE due to B-P-W in the case of
finite player games.
Recursive Definition of CPNE
:
For any singleton coalition (i>, define a
to be optimal for {i} if i is playing a best response in a.
Having defined optimality for all coalitions of size (k-1) or less,
define optimality for a coalition S of size k (>2) , as follows.
Say that a is self -enforcing for S if it is optimal for every TcS
.
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Say that a is optimal for S if it is self -enforcing for S, and there does
not exist any b self -enforcing for S such that (b,S) trumps (a,S).
Finally, if N is finite, say that a is an R (recursive) -CPNE if a is
optimal for N.
The following example illustrates that the semi-consistent partition is
an improvement on the consistent partition. It shows that there are cases in
which the S-CPNE coincides with the R-CPNE, but there is no consistent
partition. Since the S-CPNE is a strong equilibrium in this example, it also
shows that corollary 1 would fail to hold if we used consistency rather than
semi-consistency as the basis of the definition.
Example 3: N = {1,2}, A = [-2,1], A = [-1,1),
U(a ,a) =U(a ,a) = aa .
1 1 2- 2 12 12
In this example, strategy vector (-2,-1) strictly Pareto dominates all
other strategy vectors. Since it is self enforcing, it is the unique R-CPNE.
It is also the unique S-CPNE, since ((2,1),N) belongs to G However there is
no consistent partition; for example, agreements of the form ((1, a ),{2})
are neither good nor bad, by an argument identical to that of example 1.
In this example, the equilibrium is intuitively plausible, and the two
definitions coincide. In general the S-CPNE are a subset of the R-CPNE, as
the following theorem demonstrates:
Theorem 3^ In a finite player game, if a is a S-CPNE, it is a R-CPNE, but
the converse is not true.
11
Proof Let (a,S) G G in a semi-consistent partition. We use an inductive
method to establish that a is optimal for S. This is obviously true for any
singleton S. So suppose it is true for all coalitions of size not exceeding
k-1, and let #S = k.
First, we establish that a is self -enforcing for S. If not, there exists
T c S for which a is not optimal. By the inductive hypothesis, (a,T) G G.
Therefore it is trumped by (b,V) G B. But then (b,V) trump's (a,S). This
contradicts (a,S) G G.
Next, we show there cannot be any d which is self -enforcing for S such
that (d,S) trumps (a,S). Suppose there is. Since (a,S)GG, (d,S) must be in B.
We claim that there exists (e,S) G G which trumps (a,S), which would lead
to a contradiction. Since (d,S) G B, there exists (f,T) G G which trumps
(d,S). If T C S, the induction hypothesis implies f is optimal for T. Then d
cannot be optimal for T, contradicting the hypothesis that d is self -enforcing
for S. So we must have (f,S) G G which trumps (d,S) and therefore also (a,S).
Putting e = f, we are done. That the converse is not true is established by
the following example.
Example 4: N - {1,2}, A ={0,1}, A - [0,1),
U (a ,a ) = U (a ,a ) = a a .112 2 12 12
In this game, there is a unique Nash equilibrium (0,0). Since this is the
only self -enforcing strategy vector for {1,2}, it is optimal for {1,2}, and
therefore a R-CPNE. We claim that (0,N) G G. Suppose otherwise. Now (0,N) is
trumped by (a,N) where a a > 0. So it must be that (a,N) G B, and there
exists (c,S) G G trumping (a,N) . If S = N, then (c,N) would also trump (0,N),
a contradiction. Clearly S must be {2} and c - 1. c >a. So ((l,c),{2)) eG
.
12 2 2
12
This is trumped by ((l,c+e),{2}), which must therefore be in B. Any agreement
* *
that trumps this must be ((l,a ),{2}) with a > c +c . Therefore, there is222
((l,a*),{2)) G G, with a* > c +e > c -- so it trumps ((l,c),{2)) G G, a
contradiction.
The R-CPNE in this example appears unreasonable, since it has player 1
choosing a dominated strategy. If 2 conjectures that 1 will not play a
dominated strategy, 2 should play some a close to 1. The importance of self
enforcing agreements is that they protect a player from being "double-crossed"
but in this example, they prevent players from enjoying mutually beneficial
actions, solely because there is no "best" such action. Were we to allow in
some fashion "near-rational" behavior for the coalition (1,2), we would be
able to describe actions a with a and a both close to 1 as "almost"
"" 12
self -enforcing, and therefore superior to 0. In the following section, we
extend our approach to allow for such forms of "almost" self -enforcing
agreements
.
With a slightly more complicated example, we can show that R-CPNE need
not be S-CPNE, even in a game with compact strategies and continuous utility
functions
:
Example 5:
N = (1,2,3,4), A = [0,l]x(0,l}
i
U/a) - P
1
P2P3P4
[x
a
- |x
i
-x
2
|]
U
2
(a) - p
i
p
2
p
3
p
4
[2x
i
- x
3
- |x
2
-x
3
|]
U(a)=pppp[2x -x - |x -x |(l-x +x )]
3
t
l
r T3 tV 1 2 ' 1 3 ' 1 2 '
U (a) - ppppfx]
A 1 2 3 A A
13
where x denotes the real number in [0,1] chosen by i, and pe(0,l) the second
i i
component of i's decision. (Think of this game as an extension of the game in
k k k k
example 2: Call any agreement with p=p =p = p=la "participative"
agreement; if all four players agree, players 1-3 play the game in example 2;
otherwise, all players receive 0.)
k k k k
It is obvious that any strategy with p=p*= P = p=0is
self -enforcing for N. We shall establish that any such agreement is an R-CPNE
but not a S-CPNE.
To show that any such strategy a is an R-CPNE, note that any trumping
agreement must be participative. However, no participative b is
self -enforcing for N. Suppose otherwise; then it must constitute a Nash
equilibrium, and x = x = x = x, say, while x =1. If x < 1, then anyn
l 2 3
J
a
J
participative strategy c with real-valued components (x+e , x+e ,x+e , 1) is
self -enforcing for {1,2,3}. This is established by arguments analogous to
those in example 2: neither of the first three players can unilaterally
deviate profitably, and neither can any pair-subcoalition of {1,2,3} engineer
a coordinated deviation that is self -enforcing. So b cannot be self -enforcing
for N, as (b,N) is trumped by (c, {1,2,3}), implying that b cannot be optimal
for {1,2,3}. If x = 1, then (b,N) is trumped by (d,{2,3}), where d is a
k kparticipative strategy with x = x =0, which is optimal for {2,3}.
We next show that (a,N)
€
G in any semi-consistent partition. Now (a,N)
k k
is trumped by (e,N) where e is a participative strategy vector and x = x =
k k
x = x < 1 and x =1. If (e, N)
€
B then (a,N) <J G, and we are done.
3 k
Therefore, suppose that (e,N) e B. If so, there is something in G which
trumps it. It cannot involve singletons, or paired coalitions, neither can it
include player 4. So it must involve the coalition {1,2,3}. Further, to be in
k k k *
G, it must involve x = x = x = x where x < x* < 1. But any such agreement
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must be in U, by reasoning which is identical to that of example 2.
Therefore (e,N) e U. Contradiction.
The two examples above establish that the recursive and non- recursive
formulations are not identical in all cases. Since the equilibria generated
by a consistent partition are S-CPNE, example 5 demonstrates a fortiori that
the characterization in terms of consistent partitions is not equivalent to
the recursive formulation. The following theorems establish circumstances in
which the S-CPNE and the R-CPNE coincide:
Theorem 4 For finite player games, if a consistent partition exists the
S-CPNE and R-CPNE coincide.
Proof Since a consistent- partition is a serai-consistent partition with U
= 0, the uniqueness of the consistent partition follows from Theorem 2. Any
agreement in B is trumped by an agreement in G and by Theorem 3 all agreements
in G are optimal, so all agreements in B are non optimal. Since these two
sets exhaust the set of agreements, the set G equals the set of optimal
agreements .
In order to demonstrate the equivalence of the various versions of CPNE
we require that the consistent partition exists. In one important case
existence is easily established:
Theorem 5: In any finite player, finite strategy game, a consistent
partition exists.
Proof : By Theorem I, a semi-consistent partition exists, and by Lemma 1
15
(a) the set U is empty.
Since our results seem to be different from those noted in Greenberg
[1986] it is important to point the source of the discrepancy. Greenberg
finds that R-CPNE can be characterized by using consistent partitions. His
approach however assumes that a consistent partition exists. This cannot be
demonstrated in general, except for finite-player, finite-action games.
III. Extended Agreements
The recursive and non-recursive definitions are equivalent for games with
finite strategy spaces and finite numbers of players. The equivalence breaks
down in other cases. In example 4 equivalence would be restored if we
modified the game by adding strategies which corresponded to the limit points
of the strategy space. But example 5 demonstrates that this proposed
resolution will not work in general. In this section ve will examine a
more satisfactory resolution for the case of infinite strategy spaces.
For this section we will assume that the set of players N" is finite, and
that each player's utility function U. is continuous on the compact strategy
space Y A.
.
An extended agreement (a,S) consists of a coalition S C N" and a sequence
c 12or strategies a = (a
,
a
, ...) which satisfies the following conditions:
1: The sequence converges.
2: For ail t
€
S, a
k
= a
k
for all k, k'
.
t t
In other words, an extended agreement is a sequence of coordinated
16
actions by the members of coalition S, holding the actions of non-members
fixed. Extended agreements include simple agreements as a special case:
identify a simple agreement with an extended agreement in which the sequence
*
of strategy vectors is constant. Let A denote the set of extended agreements.
An extended agreement (b,T) trumps (a,S) if
(a) TCS
(b) There exists k such that b = a for all j e N\T
j j
(c) lim U (bk ) > lim U (a
k
) for all ieT.
i i
It is useful to note that (b,T) trumps (a,S) implies that it also trumps (a,V)
for any VDT if (a,V) is in A . Trumping agreements are coordinated deviations
from initial agreements: At any step in the process that forms the initial
extended agreement, say k, a subcoalition can agree to break away and follow
their own coordinated deviation.
The definition of a semi -consistent partition carries over without
modification, as do the proofs of theorems 1 and 2 establishing the existence
and uniqueness of the semi-consistent partition.
A strategy vector a* is an Extended Semi -Cons is tent Coalition Proof Nash
Equilibrium (ES-CPNE) if it is the limit of a sequence of strategy vectors a,
where (a,N) is in G for the semi -consistent partition of extended agreements.
For finite-player games, there is a recursive definition in extended
agreements analogous to the recursive definition of the previous section:
Recursive Definition of Extended CPNE
:
For any singleton coalition {i}, say
that (a,{i)) e A is optimal if there does not exist any (b, {i}) in A which
trumps (a
,
( i } )
.
17
Having defined optimality for all coalitions of size (k-1) or less,
.define optimality for a coalition S of size k (>2) , as follows.
Say that (a,S) G A is self -enforcing if there does not exist an optimal
(b,T) that trumps (a,S), with T c S.
Say that (a,S) is optimal if it is self -enforcing and there does not
exist any self -enforcing (b,S) that trumps (a,S).
Finally, if N is finite, say that the strategy vector a* is an Extended
Recurs ive-CPNE (ER-CPNE) if it is the limit of a sequence of strategy vectors
a such that extended agreement (a,N) is optimal.
The next result is the major result of the paper. It says that if we
define coalition proof equilibria in terms of extended agreements, then for
all finite player games -- those with infinite strategy spaces as well as
finite strategy spaces -- the recursive and the non-recursive definitions are
equivalent
.
Theorem 6: Using extended agreements, there is a unique semi -consistent
partition, which is also a consistent partition. In this consistent
partition, (a,S) e G if and only if (a,S) is optimal; hence the limit of a is
an ER-CPNE if and only if it is an ES-CPNE.
Proof: See appendix.
A consequence of the proof of this theorem is that there is an
equivalent, somewhat simpler recursive definition.
18
Corollary : The following definition is equivalent to the other definitions of
Extended CPNE
.
Alternative Recursive Definition of Extended CPNE: For any singleton
coalition (i), say that all (a,(i)) G A are self -enforcing.
Having defined self -enforcing for all coalitions of size (k-1) or less,
define it for a coalition S of size k (k>2) as follows.
Say that (a,S) 6 A is self -enforcing if there does not exist a self-
enforcing (b,T) that trumps (a,S), with T C S.
Finally, if N is finite, say that the strategy vector a* is an
Extended -CPNE if it is the limit of a sequence of strategy vectors a such that
the extended agreement (a,N) is self -enforcing and not trumped by any self
enforcing agreement.
Proof
:
See appendix.
It is instructive to use examples 2 and 5 to contrast the extended
equilibrium definition with the initial definitions. In example 2, the unique
extended equilibrium is the point (1,1,1). Although it is not self enforcing,
it is the limit of a sequence of self enforcing agreements (x,x,x) and is the
optimal member of this class. There was no R-CPNE and no S-CPNE.
Example 5 shows the power of our new definition. The fact that the set
of optimal three player agreements is empty allows unreasonable R-CPNE in the
four player game. Our definition of an S-CPNE eliminates these equilibria,
but does not suggest an alternative. The extended equilibrium for this
example is the point (1,1,1,1): it is "almost" self enforcing, and is maximal
among such points.
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IV. Games with a Countably Infinite Number of Players
Theorem 1, demonstrating the existence of a semi-consistent partition,
does not depend on the number of players in the game being finite. But if
there is a countable infinity of players, the semi-consistent partition need
not be unique. This fact gives rise to the following definitions:
The strategy vector aeA is a Weakly Consistent CPNE if (a^N)eG for some
semi-consistent partition of A. It is a Strongly Consistent CPNE if (a,N)eG
for every serai-consistent partition.
The following example illustrates the distinction:
Example 6 : N - {1,2,3...}; A. = {0,1} for i e N.
Thus a strategy vector is an infinite string of zeros and ones. In this
game any strategy vector gives a payoff of zero to all players, except for
strategy vectors listed in the table below. For a strategy vector x =
(x-.X-.x . ..) in the table, the corresponding payoff vector u =1* 2' 3
i i i
lrV u 3(u u , . ..) is indicated to the right
x
1
= (1 1 1 1 1 1 ...
)
u
1
= (2,2,2,2,2,2,
x =(100000...) u 2 =(1,3, 3, 3, 3, 3,
x
3
= (1 1 1 1 i ...) u
3
= (1,1,4,4,4,4,
x =(101000...) u4 =(1,1, 1,5, 5, 5,
x = (1 1 1 ...) u°° = (1,1,1,1,1,1,.
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In this game there are two complete consistent partitions; in one all the even
numbered strings are Weakly Consistent CPNE, in the other all the odd numbered
strings are Weakly Consistent CPNE. There is no Strongly Consistent CPNE.
CO
Note that x is not an equilibrium in either partition.*
It might seem a difficult matter to check whether an agreement is in
every semi-consistent partition; in fact the procedure for doing so is
relatively simple. This is due to the following theorem:
Theorem 7
:
There exists a minimal semi-consistent partition {G
,
U
,
B } --
* * *
that is {G
,
U
,
B } is a semi-consistent partition such that for every
othersemi-consistent partition {G, U, B) G c G, and B c B.
Proof : In the derivation in theorem 1, note that the set G will belong to
the G set in any semi -consistent partition, B will belong to the B set in any
semi-consistent partition, and if G. belongs to any semi-consistent
partition, then B. , and G. must as well.Bl-l 1
Thus the minimal semi-consistent partition is precisely the
semi-consistent partition generated in theorem 1. As an immediate
consequence, we have the following characterization:
Corollary : a is a strongly consistent CPNE if and only if agreement (a,N)
belongs to some set G. for i = 0,1,2.. where the sets G. are defined as
follows
:
G is the set of agreements which are not trumped by any agreement in A.
For i = 1,2,.., G. is the set of agreements which are trumped by no
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agreement in A, except for agreements which are in turn trumped by some
agreement in G. ,
.
Note that this is a recursive characterization as well, but unlike the
B-P-W definition, it does not require recursion on the number of members of
the agreement. Thus this new characterization, unlike the B-P-W definition,
is applicable to games with infinite numbers of players.
IV: Summary and Comments
In order to propose yet another modification of yet another solution
concept, the proposer ought to give three sorts of justifications. First, to
demonstrate that it is indeed a modification, the new definition and the
original ought to be posed in such a form that the similarities are apparent.
This we have done by comparing semi-consistent partitions with consistent
partitions, and extended agreements with agreements.
Second, the proposer ought to show in examples that the new solution
concept yields more "intuitive" results than does the original. We have done
this as well: Compare the extended agreement with any of the initial
agreements for example 5.
Third, and in our view most important, the proposer ought to demonstrate
that theorems that hold for the original definition hold with greater
generality or more regularity with the new definition. The result we have
examined is the fact that Coalition Proof Equilibrium as recursively defined
can be characterized by a consistency criterion. For the original definition
this is true when action sets are finite, but not when they are infinite. For
our definition with extended agreements the characterization holds generally.
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When we extend the solution in extended agreements to situations with
countably infinite numbers of players, semi-consistent partitions will no
longer be unique, leading to weak and strong versions of the definition in
terms of semi-consistency. In this case, we would argue that the strong
version has the greater claim to our attention, if for no other reason than
that theorem 1 gives us an explicit method for finding the solutions. This
method can be given the following interpretation: An agreement is a good one
if 1) no other agreement blocks it (strong equilibria would fall in this
category) or if 2) no agreement blocks it except for agreements that are
blocked by agreements of the first kind, or if 3) no agreement blocks it
except agreements that are blocked by agreements of the first or second kind,
and so forth.
Future papers will apply these two modifications to other solution
concepts
.
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Appendix
In general trumping is not a transitive relation. Nonetheless, for both
agreements and extended agreements the following is valid:
Lemma A.l: If (c,S) trumps (b,S) and (b,S) trumps (a,T) then (c,S) trumps
(a,T).
Proof: Parts (i) and (iii) of the definition of trumping are immediately
verified. Part (ii) obvious in the case of simple agreements; for extended
k k k k
agreements it is nearly so: if b. = a. for i G S, then c. = a. for i G S.H
Note : In particular, by setting S = T we have transitivity on any set of
agreements for a single coalition.
Proof of Theorem 2
:
Consider any two semi-consistent partitions {G U B } and {G U B }.
Claim 1
:
For any i
€ N,
(a, {i}) G G
l
o (a, {i}) G G
2
and (a, { i } ) G B
;[
o (a, {i}) B
Proof: If (a,{i)) G G then it cannot be trumped by any agreement. For any
(b,{i)) which trumps it must be in B But then (b,{i}) must be trumped by
(c,(i}) in G which then also trumps (a,{i)), a contradiction. Since (a,(i))
is not trumped by any agreement it must also be in G Reversing the
argument, (a, (i)) G G o (a, {i}) G G
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Suppose (a, {i}) G B.. . Then there exists (b, {i}) in G- which trumps it
Since (b, {i}) must also be in G it follows that (a, {i}) is in B
?
Reversing the argument, the claim is established.
Claim 2: Suppose for all coalitions T with #T < k-1, it is true that
(a, T) G G
1
« (a, T) G G
2
and (a, T) G B « (a, T) B
then the same is true for coalitions of size k
Proof : Suppose for T of size k, (a,T) G G (a,T) G G Then (a,T) is
trumped by (b,V) which is not in B If V is a proper subset of T, then the
induction hypothesis implies that (b,V) is not in B ; contradicting (a,T) e
The other possibility is that V = T, in which case, (b,T) not in B
trumps (a,T). Now (a,T) G G implies (b,T) G B So (b,T) must be trumped
by some (c,W) g G W cannot equal T; otherwise (c,W) would also trump (a,T).
W c T implies (c,W) G G implying (b,T) G B 9 , a contradiction. We conclude
that (a,T) G G implies (a,T) G G
Suppose (a,T) G B Then there exists (b,W) g G which trumps it. By
the above reasoning, (b,W) ^ G so (a,T) G B
Reversing the argument completes the proof.
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Proof of Theorem 6
:
The proof proceeds through a series of lemmas. We begin with
a notational convention, some definitions, and a preliminary observation.
Notational Convention: If d is a convergent sequence of strategy
vectors, we will use the notation d to represent the limit strategy vector.
For x, y in R , let x > y mean x. > y. for i = 1, . . n. We will say set
A dominates x if a > x for some a in A. x is an upper bound for A if A does
not dominate x.
Observation: If A is bounded and A dominates x, then there is a point z in
the closure of A such that z > x and z is an upper bound for A.
Proof of Observation : There exists a in A such that a > x. Define the set B
to be points in the closure of A such that m. > a. for i = 1, . .n. B is a
l - l
non-empty, compact set. Pick z in B to maximize 2.. z . .
Lemma A. 2
:
For any non-empty, bounded set A in R
,
either there is a point x
in A which is an upper bound for A or there is a sequence of strictly
increasing points in A whose limit is an upper bound for A.
Proof : Define a sequence recursively as follows:
Given a
. ,
if it is an upper bound for A, stop. Otherwise, using the
above observation, pick z. > a. . which is an upper bound for A and which is
the limit of a sequence of points in A. From that sequence, we can pick a.
such that a. is strictly greater than a. , and the distance between a. and z.
i J b l-l l l
is less than 2
If the process terminates the theorem is proved. If the process does not
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terminate, take a convergent subsequence of z.'s. The corresponding a.'s form
the desired sequence.
The key result is the following lemma: it rules out "openness" of the set
of self -enforcing agreements.
Lemma A. 3
:
Suppose (a, T) is not optimal, but is self enforcing (if #T > 2)
then there exists (c , T) which is optimal and trumps (a, T)
.
Proof : The result is obvious for a singleton coalition. For #T > 2 , let
k k6 = ((d,T) self enforcing | d. = a. for i € T
In other words any self -enforcing agreement which trumps (a,T) must be in
=T
£>
. Consider the set Im t? , the image in (R , the space of payoffs for members
of T, from the limit strategy vectors for all extended agreements in (? . Note
that an extended agreement in G is optimal if and only if its image is an
upper bound in Im £ . Applying lemma A. 2 to Im S, we can conclude that either
there is an optimal agreement that trumps (a,T) or there is a sequence of
extended agreements with strictly increasing utility for all members of T,
whose utility converges to an upper bound. This sequence of extended
agreements will have a subsequence
(d(l),T), (d(2),T), (d(3),T) ...
such that
27
^r ^r "st
d (1), d (2), d (3), .
is a convergent sequence (recall the notational convention) . Call the limit
strategy vector c .
Now choose a sequence of strategy vectors, one from each d(i), such that
this sequence also converges to c . Call this "diagonalized" sequence c.
Agreement (c,T) trumps (a,T) and no element of £ trumps (c,T). If (c,T) is
self -enforcing, we are done.
Suppose (c,T) is not self enforcing. Then it is trumped by an optimal
agreement (f ,V) , with V c T. That means that all members of V strictly prefer
f to c , and that for some k
f.= c. for all i
€
V
~i ~i
k k' k
But for some d(m) and some k'
,
c = d (m) . And for all i € V, f
.
k'
f. . That is to say, for k'
—
1 j
f. = c. for all i € V
~l - i
* * *
And since all members of T prefer c to d (m) , all members of V prefer f to
d (m)
.
That is co say, (f,V) trumps (d (m),T), contradicting che assumption
that all agreements in G were self -enforcing.
Lemma A.4j_ An optimal extended agreement is not trumped by any self enforcing
extended agreement.
Proof: Suppose otherwise that (a,T) is optimal and trumped by a
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self-enforcing (b,S). Since one optimal extended agreement cannot be trumped
by another, (b,S) must not be optimal. But then by the preceding lemma there
exists an optimal (c,S) which trumps (b,S). And by Lemma A.l, (c,S) trumps
(a,T), a contradiction.
Lemma A 5_L For any semi consistent partition, (a,T) e G implies (a,T) is
optimal
.
Proof : Identical to the proof for simple agreements in theorem 2 of the text.
Lemma A 6j_ Suppose we have a semi-consistent partition with the property
that for all coalitions T of size not exceeding k-1 (> 2), (a,T) E U implies
that (a,T) is self -enforcing. Then (a,T) is optimal implies (a,T) £ G.
Proof: If (a,T) is in U it is trumped by (b,V) in U. Since the size of V is
no greater than the size of T, (b,V) is self enforcing by the hypothesis of
the lemma. Then by lemma A. 4, (a,T) is not optimal.
If (a,T) is in B, it is trumped by (b,V) in G. By lemma A. 5 (b,V) is
optimal, therefore (a,T) is not optimal.
Lemma A 7j_ Given a semi-consistent partition and a coalition T (with #T > 2)
,
(a,T) e U implies that (a,T) is self -enforcing.
Proof : Suppose #T = 2 . Then (a,T) not self -enforcing , means that there is a
player i in T such that (a,T) is trumped by an optimal (c,{i}). For a
single-player agreement to be optimal, it cannot be trumped by any
agreement, and therefore (c,{i}) e G, contradicting (a,T) E U.
Now suppose the result is true for any T with #T < k - 1, and consider
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the case where ~T = k. If (a,T) e U is not self -enforcing then there exists an
optimal (b,W), with W c T, such that (b,W) trumps (a,T). Since #W < k - 1,
application of the preceding lemma implies that (b,W) is in G, contradicting
the assertion that (a,T) E U.
Lemma A 8j_ (a,T) is optimal if and only if (a,T) G G in the semi-consistent
partition.
Proof: Combining the two preceding lemmas we conclude that (a,T) optimal
implies (a,T) e G. The reverse implication is lemma A. 5. The uniqueness of
the semi-consistent partition follows from the fact that the set of optimal
agreements is constructed without any reference to consistent partitions.
Lemma A 9j_ U is empty; i.e. the semi consistent partition is consistent.
Proof: Suppose (a,S) G U. By lemma 3, (a,S) is self -enforcing. By the
preceding lemma, (a,S) G G implies (a,S) is not optimal. Thus there is (c.Sj
which is optimal and which trumps (a,S). By the preceding lemma (c,S) G G
trumps (a,S) G U, a contradiction.
Proof of Corollary :
The equivalence follows from the following fact: (a,T) is self enforcing
if and only if it is not trumped by any self enforcing (b,S) with S c T.
"If" follows from the fact that optimal agreements are a subset of self
enforcing agreements. To prove "Only if" we show that if (a,T) is trumped by
a self enforcing (b,S) with S c T, then it is trumped by an optimal (c,S).
This follows by applying lemma A. 3 and lemma A.l.
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Footnotes
As shown below, the difficulties arise even with compact strategy spaces and
continuous utility function.
2
For the use of a similar generalization for cooperative games, see Dutta et
al . [1989] in the case of the bargaining set, and Roth [1976] in the case of
the core.
3
It would be equivalent to give the definition with only one-way implications
in the descriptions of G and B; for the consistent system the reverse
implications are a consequence of the fact that {G,B} forms a partition of the
set of all agreements. Note the obvious parallel between consistency and the
von Neumann Morgenstern [1947] solution concept.
4
In the definition of a semi-consistent system, unlike the definition of a
consistent system, the double implications are crucial. It is possible that
in a semi -consistent partition, the good set is empty, (and therefore the bad
set is as well). This is the case in example 1 above. However the good set
will not be empty if the payoff functions are continuous and individual
players' strategy sets are closed.
Again, having an open set of strategies is not necessary; more complicated
examples can be derived in which payoffs are continuous on a compact strategy
space
.
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A natural extension of this approach will handle games with discontinuous
payoffs by modifying (iii) in the definition of trumping as follows:
k klim inf U.(b ) > lim sup U.(a ) .
To handle non-compact action spaces as well, it will be necessary to
substitute monotonic sequences for convergent sequences of strategy vectors,
and to use the overtaking criterion for comparison of limit payoffs.
An alternate proof of uniqueness is provided in theorem 6.
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